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Appellant submits this Reply to the brief of the Salt Lake 
County Mental Health Appellees (hereinafter "SLCMH"). 
I. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
SLCMH's "issues" punctuate its contradictory approach to this 
case. SLCMH casts the "issues" as legal questions but spends its 
brief resolving the "issues" by construing the "facts" in its 
favor. While this approach acknowledges the issues are fact-
dependent , it is inappropriate to review a summary judgment that 
Appellant opposed. 
The statement of the "duty" issue by SLCMH highlights the 
incongruous approach. SLCMH asserts the issue is whether the lower 
court erred in finding "no duty." By comparison, the cases and 
commentators that have examined the "duty" arising from the 
relationship between psychotherapists and patients explicitly rely 
upon the facts in evidence to determine if a duty arises for the 
benefit of another. Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1070 (Del. 
Supr. 1988) (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 37 at 236 (5th Ed. 1984)). 
The material facts, when considered in the light most 
favorable to the Appellant, support an affirmative duty owed to 
Shaundra Higgins because the facts establish a "special 
relationship" between SLCMH and Trujillo as well as its "control" 
of Trujillo. In addition, SLCMHfs broad based obligation as a 
mental health provider is sufficient to impose a duty for the 
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benefit of Shaundra Higgins, Appellant's daughter. Naidu v. Laird, 
539 A.2d at 1073. 
In recognition that there is a duty, SLCMH proposes three 
additional ffissues" to avoid liability to Kathy Higgins: (1) 
whether Kathy Higgins1 individual claim for emotional distress is 
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, 
et seq. (1953, as amended); (2) whether Kathy Higgins1 individual 
claim is barred by not sending a notice of claim under the 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1953, as 
amended); or, (3) whether Kathy Higgins1 individual claim is barred 
by her purported failure to state a claim for infliction of 
emotional distress. This. Reply will address these "issues" even 
though the trial court did not rule on them. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
SLCMHfs ninety-three paragraph Statement of Facts ignores the 
well-accepted principle that disputed material facts render summary 
judgment inappropriate. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Critical "facts" 
set forth by SLCMH in the court below were disputed. [R at 1931-
1983.] Those facts are still disputed, are not "material facts," 
or represent legal conclusions. 
1
 The following fact paragraphs "realleged" by SLCMH in its 
brief were specifically disputed below: 16, 17, 19, 22, 34, 37, 
45-47, 50, 52, 54, 55, 64, 70, 72, 81-83. Other fact paragraphs 
"realleged" in the brief were admitted in the trial court only with 
the addition of necessary material facts to make the "fact" 
statements accurate: 28-33, 39, 43, 44, 53, 58-61, 63, 68, 69, 71, 
75. The following fact paragraphs are now raised in the brief of 
SLCMH for the first time and could not be responded to below: 25-
27, 73, 76-78, 88, 90 and 91. Similarly, the following fact 
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The following facts, in addition to those set forth in 
Appellant's opening brief, must be considered in the light most 
favorable to Appellant. Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 
(Utah 1989). The facts require a reversal of the lower court's 
decision because they establish, inter alia, a "special 
relationship" and SLCMH's "control" of Trujillo. 
1. Trujillo, before and at the time she stabbed Shaundra, had 
an extensive and well-documented psychological history, 
characterized by a major mental illness, schizophrenia, as well as 
organic brain dysfunction and marginal intelligence. [Appellant's 
Brief, pages 7-13; Appellee's Brief, fact paragraphs 21, 22, 61 and 
77. ] 
2. Trujillo, before and at the time she stabbed Shaundra, had 
an extensive, well-documented history of crime and violence, 
including a very similar prior stabbing. [Appellant's Brief, pages 
13-16; Appellee's Brief, fact paragraphs 25-38.] 
3. Trujillo, at the time she stabbed Shaundra, had been a 
patient of SLCMH, on either a voluntary or involuntary basis, for 
almost nine years. One involuntary placement occurred in February 
1982 and ran through February of 1983 and resulted from court-
ordered sentences that placed Trujillo into SLCMH's care. 
[Appellant's Brief, pages 9-11, 13-24; Appellee's Brief, fact 
paragraphs 24, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44, and 63.] 
paragraphs in the SLCMH brief were not alleged below or call for 
legal conclusions and are not facts at all: 1-8, 10-15, 26. 
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4. SLCMH was consulted about the sentences, and specifically 
agreed with probation authorities to provide mental health 
treatments three days a week to Trujillo, to provide for a weekly 
visit with her primary therapist "Sheryl Steadman," and to provide 
medications to Trujillo. [Appellant's Brief, page 15; Steadman 
Depo. at 90-91; R. at 2371.] 
5. SLCMH did not provide the other court-ordered conditions 
and erroneously advised probation authorities at the end of a one-
year period that Trujillo was "taking her medications and attending 
her treatment sessions" and that it would "continue to monitor her 
medication and urge her to attend therapy." Probation officials 
repeated these erroneous representations to the sentencing courts 
and recommended Trujillofs probation be terminated. [Appellant's 
Brief, page 15; R. at 1733.] 
6. The courts terminated the probation [R. at 1735] and 
Trujillo decompensated, causing her family and Trujillo to seek 
treatment and care from SLCMH to control her psychosis and 
violence. [Appellant's Brief, pages 16-17; Affids. of Trujillo's 
family; R. at 1701-1713.] Appellant's experts indicate that at 
this time, and through the date of the stabbing, Trujillo presented 
an unacceptably high level of risk that she would act violently 
toward herself and others. [R. at 1759-1767, 2123-2126.] 
7. On February 25, 1984, Trujillo's family specifically 
requested SLCMH hospitalize Trujillo at its inpatient unit, the 
University Medical Center, because she was psychotic, had wounds to 
her wrists, and the family could not handle her. SLCMH referred 
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Trujillo for an "evaluation" to the Medical Center but told the 
family that "no County beds were available." [R. at 1893.] The 
record demonstrates there was not a limit on the number of county 
beds. [Erickson Depo. at 109; R. at 1703-1704, 1713, 1893 and 
2380. ] 
8. Trujillo and her mother, in reliance upon and at the 
direction of SLCMH, went to the Medical Center and again requested 
to be hospitalized at the SLCMH inpatient unit. [R. at 1701-1706.] 
Even though Trujillo was openly psychotic, suffering from dangerous 
hallucinations and complaining of self-inflicted wounds, the 
Medical Center repeated the County line that Trujillo could not be 
admitted due to bed shortages. [R. at 1125.] The Medical Center 
then sent Trujillo to a SLCMH "group home" known as the Adult 
Residential Treatment Unit ("ARTU"). Appellant's experts indicate 
the failure to admit Trujillo and the referral to ARTU fell below 
appropriate standards of care for Trujillo, who needed an extended 
hospitalization. [R. at 1668, 1761-1766.] 
9. ARTU was a minimally therapeutic setting without 
adequately qualified or sufficiently available staff. It was not 
an appropriate substitute for the in-patient hospitalization 
Trujillo required. [R. at 1665-1671.] Trujillo was sent to this 
facility, however, for the explicit reason she would be seen by 
Sheryl Steadman, her SLCMH "primary therapist." [R. at 1125.] 
Sheryl Steadman never saw Trujillo while she was at ARTU and 
candidly admitted in her deposition that she did not see or 
evaluate Trujillo and did not know "whether hospitalization was 
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appropriate." [Steadman Depo. at 138-139; R. at 1668, 1761-1766, 
2371. ] 
10. Even though Trujillo's family did not believe the group 
home would help her, they abided by the explicit instructions of 
SLCMH and took Trujillo to ARTU because they could not afford a 
private hospital. Upon their arrival at ARTU, the family told ARTU 
that Trujillo was just there pending a bed at the inpatient unit 
and Trujillo herself requested hospitalization after having been at 
ARTU. [Romero Depo. at 82; Steadman Depo. at 138; R. at 1701-1712; 
2371.] 
11. Trujillo was never seen by her "responsible physician," 
Dr. William Kuentzel, while at ARTU. Instead, she was assigned to 
Larry Romero, who was not qualified but formulated Trujillo1s 
treatment plan. The "plan" did not evaluate or diffuse Trujillofs 
propensities for violence [R. at 1761-1766] and the only licensed 
doctor to see Trujillo, Dr. Joy Ely, a part-time psychiatrist with 
a restricted role of prescribing medications, found Trujillo during 
this time to be "erratic," "non-adaptive," "labile," and displaying 
a complete "lack of insight." [Ely Depo. at 22; R. at 2371.] Dr. 
Ely recommended a substantial increase in dosages of medication to 
control Trujillo but the increased dosages were never administered. 
[Stevens Depo. at 36; R. at 2382.] 
12. ARTU returned Trujillo back to Trujillo1s family and the 
environment of the earlier stabbing. Trujillo1s family took her 
back because she "had no other place to go." [R. at 1710.] 
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13. Trujillo was placed as a patient in the "evening-weekend" 
program operated by SLCMH upon her release. Larry Romero was 
assigned as Trujillo's therapist for the program but did not see 
Trujillo after she left ARTU. Trujillo missed many of the 
"evening-weekend" sessions, including every session for the week 
Shaundra was stabbed. In fact, Shaundra was stabbed at the very 
time Trujillo was to be in a treatment session. [R. at 1757.] 
14. The hallucinations that afflicted Trujillo continued from 
the time Trujillo left ARTU until the stabbing. [R. at 1708-1711, 
2235.] Trujillo presented an unacceptably high level of risk 
during this time that she would act violently toward others and 
SLCMH should have known, by a proper evaluation and diagnosis of 
Trujillo, of the unacceptably high level of risk. [R. at 1761-
1767; 2123-2126.] 
15. SLCMH failed to properly assess and treat the risk, in 
violation of the appropriate standard of care, because, among other 
things, it did not review medical records; it did not involve 
experienced and qualified personnel to evaluate and diagnose 
Trujillo; it failed to provide meaningful psychiatric intervention; 
it allowed medication to be prescribed by non-psychiatrists which 
medication was far less than that recommended by SLCMH fs own 
doctors to control Trujillo; it failed to evaluate or diffuse 
Trujillo's propensities for violence; and, it failed to voluntarily 
or involuntarily hospitalize Trujillo for extended periods. [R. at 
1761-1767; 2123-2126.] 
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16. As a result of these failures, Trujillo1s psychosis and 
violence continued. On April 10, 1984, after having had her 
request and her family's plea for hospitalization rejected, 
Trujillo violently stabbed Shaundra Higgins, a neighbor. In an in-
depth interview by psychologists at the Utah State Hospital, 
Trujillo indicated she stabbed Shaundra at the direction of an 
inner voice, after thinking of an imagined incident between 
Trujillo1s daughter and Shaundra, about which Trujillo had been 
brooding for six months. [R. at 2067-2068.] 
17. Kathy Higgins was standing in the family kitchen, which 
was close to the location of the stabbing, when she heard a "blood-
curdling scream." She ran into her back yard and saw her daughter 
fall, get up, and fall again. Shaundra then "collapsed in her 
arms" and Shaundrafs eyes "rolled back in her head." Kathy Higgins 
"realized she had been stabbed" and now suffers from nightmares and 
anxiety from the emotional distress of having her only child so 
brutally assaulted. [Depo. of Kathy Higgins at 30-35; 48-50; 72-
90; R. at 2372. ] 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
SLCMHfs assertion that there were no disputed material facts 
belies the extensive memoranda SLCMH filed, and the nearly fifty 
pages of "disputed facts" set forth by the Appellant in the trial 
court. Many of the disputed facts are central to the issue of 
whether a "special relationship" existed between the SLCMH and 
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Trujillo and whether SLCMH controlled or had the "right or ability" 
to control Trujillo• The existence of these factual disputes 
precluded summary judgment. Doe v. Arquelles/ 716 P.2d 279, 280-
281 (Utah 1985). 
The Court need only examine the SLCMH brief to see there are 
key facts in dispute. Appellant, in her opening Brief, identified 
the portions of the record containing the fact disputes and set 
forth the facts, when construed in her favor, that establish 
"duty." SLCMH, ignoring this principle, asserts 93 fact 
paragraphs, many of which are not material or are disputed. 
The relevance of fact disputes in this case becomes clear when 
considering the "duty" issue. For instance, as part of its 
argument on duty, SLCMH writes at page 30 of its brief: 
The undisputed, facts show that Caroline 
Trujillo was always treatment resistant and 
had little history of violence prior to her 
assault on Shaundra Higgins. 
This argument contradicts the extensive criminal and 
psychological history of Trujillo and the recorded demands by 
Trujillo and her family for hospitalization.2 The "duty" issue 
cannot be examined without facts, and when the facts are construed 
in Appellant's favor, it is undeniable that "duty" exists. 
SLCMH even contradicts the opinions of the County Attorney 
who prosecuted Trujillo, as set forth in a post-sentence report 
authored by Jack D. Bowers, an AP&P investigator, in which it is 
written that the County Attorney stated "he did not believe 
[Trujillo] would ever be well enough to be paroled," that the 
"attack on Shaundra Higgins was the second unprovoked attack she 
made on people with a knife," and that "Trujillo was a very 
dangerous person." [R. at 2031.] 
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B. A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED THAT IMPOSED A DUTY TO 
PROPERLY TREAT AND EVALUATE TRUJILLO AND TAKE PRECAUTIONS 
TO PROTECT OTHERS. 
SLCMH erroneously contends at page 28 of its brief that there 
was not a duty created by a "special relationship" between SLCMH 
and Trujillo. SLCMH does not and cannot cite an analogous case for 
this contention. Instead, SLCMH claims that there was not a 
"special relationship" because Trujillo was a "voluntary" 
outpatient on the day Shaundra Higgins was stabbed. The falacy of 
the argument is apparent. If the test is "voluntary" status, a 
psychotherapist would never owe a duty to meet recognized standards 
of care in treating a "voluntary" patient and protecting her 
victims, no matter how violent and dangerous the patient, and no 
matter how many people the psychotherapist knew she might stab. 
Nor would the psychotherapist owe duty even though the reason the 
patient was a dangerous "voluntary outpatient" was due to the 
breach of the standard of care in failing to admit the patient who 
is seeking hospitalization. 
Neither the preeminent authorities on tort, nor the general 
principles affording recovery for negligence in treating a violent 
mental patient, support the SLCMH argument. Prosser & Keeton, The 
Law of Torts, § 56, p. 384 (5th Ed. 1984), provides that hospitals 
and psychotherapists may be liable for the acts of dangerous mental 
patients. The leading case to which the treatise refers is 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 
(Cal. 1976), which imposed a duty to take reasonable precautions to 
control a "voluntary" patient. 551 P.2d at 340. See, also, Naidu 
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v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1073 (1988); Bradley Center, Inc. v. 
Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982) (private mental health hospital 
owed duty to control voluntary patient); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) (V.A. hospital responsible 
for voluntary out-patient previously in day care treatment); 
Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1979) (psychotherapist 
responsible for acts of voluntary out-patient). 
Prosser's treatise was recently cited with approval by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Beech v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 
(Utah 1986), where the Court acknowledged certain relationships are 
"special" as an "expression of policy." 726 P.2d 413, 418 (1986). 
The majority of cases squarely hold the psychotherapist/patient 
relationship is such a "special" relationship as a result of public 
policy, and do not distinguish when the patient is "voluntary." 
The first "policy" the courts advocate is that a 
psychotherapist, as a specialist in medicine, should be compelled 
to meet the accepted standards of care established by other 
practitioners in the profession. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 
159, 162 (Wis. 1988); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86, 98 (Kan. 
1983); Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (N.J. 1979); Tarasoff 
v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 344-345 
(Cal. 1976). This "policy" is particularly important in cases like 
this where the Appellant's experts indicate the negligent diagnosis 
and treatment, including the failure to hospitalize and properly 
medicate Trujillo, constituted a cause-in-fact of harm to a third 
party. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d at 162. 
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The second "policy" is that the judgment the therapist makes 
in diagnosing emotional and psychological disorders and in 
predicting whether a patient presents a serious threat of danger of 
violence is comparable to judgments which doctors regularly render 
under accepted rules of responsibility. But the courts do not 
require the therapist to be a soothsayer. Rather, the courts 
merely require the therapist to exercise the degree of skill, 
knowledge and care established by members of the profession. Naidu 
v. Laird, 539 A.2d at 1674; Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d at 
167-168; Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d at 514; Lipari v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. , 497 F. Supp. at 192. The Appellant's experts 
establish SLCMH did not exercise the degree of skill, knowledge and 
care established by members of the profession in this case. 
The third "policy" the courts consider is the possible breach 
of confidentiality of doctor-patient communications when a doctor 
reports a violent patient to authorities. While acknowledging a 
need to protect confidential doctor-patient communications, the 
courts recognize that confidentiality must yield where the 
interests and safety of another is threatened. See, e.g., Schuster 
v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d at 170; Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California, 551 P.2d at 347. Of course, the 
"confidentiality" problem does not arise in a case like this where 
the patient seeks hospitalization. 
The fourth "policy" is the principle of providing care for a 
mental patient in the least restrictive environment. Courts 
uniformly reject the claim that imposition of "duty" will lead to 
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overcommitment and will discourage psychotherapists from treating 
patients. Empirical data indicates that therapists have not been 
discouraged from treating dangerous patients, nor have they 
increasingly used involuntary commitment proceedings. See Schuster 
v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d at 175; Givelber, Bowers and Blitch, 
Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law In 
Action, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 443, 473-76, 486; and Mills, Sullivan and 
Eth, Protecting Third Parties: A Decade After Tarasoff, 144 Am. J. 
Psych. 68, 69-70 (Jan. 1987). Indeed, the imposition of duty to 
protect third persons from the violent propensities of a patient is 
consistent with ethical obligations perceived by psychotherapists 
to govern their behavior notwithstanding any legal obligation. 
See, e.g., Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d at 174; Lipari v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. at 192-93. 
SLCMH does not address articulated public policy but relies on 
dicta from Hokansen v. United States, 868 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1989) 
to claim that courts decline to impose "duty" upon mental hospitals 
where "voluntary patients" are concerned. Importantly, the 
plaintiffs in Hokansen expressly avoided basing their claims on the 
special relationship theory this case presents. Id. at 378. 
Moreover, Hokansen focused upon whether Kansas law imposed an 
affirmative duty to seek an involuntary commitment. The 
involuntary commitment analysis is not necessary in this case since 
Trujillo sought hospitalization. 
Additionally, the "dicta" in Hokansen that "most" courts have 
declined to extend duty to the "voluntary" patient circumstance is 
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superficial. Hokansen cites Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 
999 (D. Md. 1982) for this proposition. Hasenei acknowledged the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship is a "special relationship" 
and imposes duty when there is a right or ability to control the 
patient's conduct. 541 F. Supp. at 1009-1010. The court in 
Hasenei then looked at duty under the facts after a full trial in 
which the plaintiff's expert testified there was no basis to 
involuntarily commit the assailant and the assailant expressed 
"severe" hostility toward hospitalization. 541 F. Supp. at 1010. 
By comparison, Trujillo sought and the standard of care required 
hospitalization. Hasenei recognized that in this circumstance 
there is a duty to hospitalize and "establish" control. 541 F. 
Supp. at 1012, fn. 23.3 
Finally, the cases do-not require, as SLCMH claims, that there 
be "legal custody" over the patient. Those cases requiring 
"control" indicate it is not the product of forced custody, but a 
characteristic of the relationship between the mental health 
provider and even a voluntary patient. This is carefully addressed 
in the opinion of Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 287 S.E.2d 716, 
aff'd, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982), which held the "patient-physician 
relationship" can allow the psychotherapist to "control" the 
Hokansen also cites Hinkleman v. Borgess Medical Center, 
403 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. App. 1987) to claim there is no "duty" to 
control a voluntary patient. Hinkleman indicates that the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship is "special," but chooses to 
not impose duty as a result of facts that sharply contrast to this 
case. In Hinkleman, the patient had only two brief prior 
encounters with the hospital and had purposely left the hospital 
prior to the assault on a third person. 
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voluntary patient by exercising various degrees of authority over 
the patient. 287 S.E.2d at 721 (citing Mcintosh v. Milano, 168 
N.J. Super. 406, 403 A.2d 500 (1979); Rum River Lumber Co. v. State 
of Maine, 282 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. Supr. 1979); Lipari v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980)). 
The facts show that SLCMH had the ability and did "control" 
Trujillo in 1984. First, SLCMH refused to hospitalize Trujillo and 
sent her to ARTU. SLCMH then directed Trujillo into the Higgins 
neighborhood just before the stabbing. SLCMH did this as a 
provider of mental health services for the State Division of Mental 
Health which had the responsibility to supervise the mentally ill. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-17-5, 64-7-7 (1953, as amended). Second, when 
Trujillo was on probation from 1982 until 1983, the medical 
treatments provided by SLCMH, including a residential stay, were 
"involuntary." 
In addition, the Utah Mental Health statutes gave SLCMH the 
legal right to control Trujillo. A mental health facility can 
exercise control over a voluntary patient to restrict her release. 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-31 et seq. (1953, as amended). Also, Utah 
Code Ann. § 64-7-36 (1953, et seq.) provided for the involuntary 
hospitalization of a patient, if necessary. Because Caroline 
Trujillo was psychotic and had a well-documented history of 
violence, SLCMH owed a duty to exercise due care in its control but 
failed by, among other ways, not admitting Trujillo to its 
inpatient unit for full and complete evaluation and treatment. 
Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1070 (Del. Supr. 1988). 
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This Court's opinion in Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1989) supports this conclusion. In Owens, the Court recognized 
that certain relationships are "special" and cited the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 315 (1964) upon which the majority of cases 
rely to impose duty. The Court also cited Petersen v. State, 671 
P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983), where the Washington Supreme Court, citing 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315 and the majority of cases 
that support Appellant, held state psychotherapists have a duty to 
protect victims of a patient where the therapist could or should 
reasonably foresee that the risk engendered by the mental patientfs 
condition would endanger others. Petersen at 237 (citing Semler v. 
Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D. C , 538 F.2d 121, 124 (4th 
Cir. 1976); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 194 
(D. Neb. 1980); Williams v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 
(S.D. 1978)). 
C. THE DUTY WAS OWED TO KATHY AND SHAUNDRA HIGGINS AND THE 
PUBLIC DUTY RULE DOES NOT APPLY. 
SLCMH also asserts it owed no duty because "there was no duty 
owed to the public." [Appellant's Brief at 33.] SLCMH cites two 
Utah cases, Obray v. Malmberq, 484 P.2d 160, (Utah 1971) (failure 
of a sheriff to investigate a burglary held not actionable) and 
Christensen v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984) (deputies owed no 
duty to arrest an intoxicated motorcyclist prior to fatal 
accident), to claim "duties owed to the public are not owed to 
individuals." [Appellee's Brief at 34.] 
These cases are not psychotherapist cases and do not apply. 
The so-called "public duty" rule arises in the corrections or law 
-16-
enforcement •. .n «,i v In i i i
 r. »u. , nii.i,,. ^  i_. :J. 
owed to +->,o general publir . ai ^  ^ e , e_.jg_. , Ferree v. State/ 
7H<1 p"f2fi I4,l#) Mil (Utah 1989) (<-orv.. *t ...... *•,-,., e nu auuy 
i Ill i ifhpei I I MI
 t . i, .rcumstances" * 
cases imposing duty upon psychotherapists are different. 
They founded upon the rela^ 
.,.-.. . * ^^^r,r^Y^ 1 . i , j gd i * i'i* i D ^ psychotherapist, -
a medical professional and »,i * governmental officii erforming 
i 
accordance .L-I lppiicabie standards >t rare See, e.g. , Woodrome 
v. Benton County ' * J ": 
Petersen v . Stare, . As 
government hospitals ^MM psychiatrists axe responsibl- - u 
vi o] ent a rj
 t r'erreiid v._ 
State, 768 : -v >i \ state-operated community health 
center); Naidu v. Laird, -• \ -• •* * ^  +* 
1: iospi ta I • jdJjlonski v. United States, 
(9th Ci r. Hospita] ; Petersen v. State, -
(Wash. 1983') (state men! a 1 l,i^ s|-itdl riml i I i. iliys i • * i an l . 
SLCMHf s prol i x recitatioi i of cases tc • factua :y distinguish 
thi- .. w cases cited by SLCMH 4 >t apply 
tin , 1 111 • • I.I11111111 u J Ly ( ' iguished. 
F^* instance, SLCMH * • n , n- *>. > ::ase can he distinguished from 
Clark v. State, 47? - • • * yi- (1980)f Petersei 1 v . State, ( i i 1! 
I Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Sopf\ /-I""i. 
(• .
 rt because i_. LI.-_ told it Trujillo's condition was 
deteriorating or that Trujillo was dangerous or had engaged in 
assaultive behavior prior to her discharge from ARTU. [Appellee's 
Brief at 34-36.] The record clearly shows Trujillo had been a 
patient of SLCMH for years, SLCMH was aware of her violent past, 
and SLCMH knew she was decompensating. 
SLCMH fs attempt to distinguish this case from the "duty to 
warn" cases also does not help it. Contrary to the SLCMH1 s 
assertions, there is a fact question as to whether or not Shaundra 
Higgins was identifiable. Trujillo had been brooding about 
Shaundra, her neighbor, for six months. SLCMH did not interview 
Trujillo about this or do anything to diffuse her violence. 
Trujillo may well have revealed her preoccupation with Shaundra and 
protective steps, including appropriate warnings, could have been 
taken. 
Therefore, the duty SLCMH breached was to take the actions and 
necessary precautions in accordance with the standards of the 
profession, to properly treat and evaluate Trujillo, and to protect 
Shaundra Higgins. See Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 
1989); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1073 (Del. Supr. 1988); 
Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d 159, 172-73 (Wis. 1988); Petersen 
v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (Wash. 1983). 
Not one of the foregoing cases nor one Utah case limits duty 
to "identified victims." This Court has permitted claims for 
injuries suffered by the public. Doe v. Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279 
(Utah 1985). In Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989), the 
Court referred to cases against municipalities for injuries to the 
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patient while in jail); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 417 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding government mental hospital liable in 
third party case for failing to properly advise court about 
patient/criminal defendant's mental condition). 
E. KATHY HIGGINS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BECAUSE SHE FAILED 
TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
SLCMH erroneously claims the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et. seq., required Kathy Higgins to file 
a notice of claim on her own behalf. The Act in 1984 only required 
notice for "essential" governmental functions. Schultz v. Conger, 
755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988). An essential governmental function is 
one "which only government can perform." jtd. The courts have 
widely held that treating, evaluating and hospitalizing the 
mentally ill can be performed by a private health care provider and 
universally dismiss the assertion of governmental immunity to 
defeat a victim's claims. See Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 241 
(Wash. 1983); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. 
Neb. 1980); Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
F. APPELLANT'S CLAIMS DO NOT ARISE OUT OF FAILURE TO PERFORM 
A DISCRETIONARY ACT. 
SLCMH asserts that Count V of Appellant's Amended Complaint, 
alleging a duty to hospitalize Trujillo, complains of the breach of 
a discretionary act for which it is immune. Appellant asserts the 
acts to not admit or commit Trujillo were not governmental and the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not apply. (See Point E.) 
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The leading case is Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 
624 (2d Cir. 1954), where Judge (later Justice) Harlen expressed 
that the assault and battery exception did not bar suit for 
negligence leading to an assault by a non-governmental employee. 
See, also, Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968) 
(permitting claim where assault by non-governmental employee); 
Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).4 
H. APPELLANT KATHY HIGGINS HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
SLCMH further claims that Kathy Higgins does not have a cause 
of action for infliction of emotional distress because she was not 
present at the time Caroline Trujillo stabbed Shaundra, and was not 
within the "zone of danger" required for this cause of action. 
[Appellant's Brief at 41.] 
The facts in this case indicate that Kathy Higgins heard her 
daughter scream, saw her fall, and then caught her as she 
collapsed. Kathy, therefore, "witnessed" the stabbing which has 
caused her emotional shock and trauma. See Navaroff v. Superior 
Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553 (1978) (mother 
hearing but not seeing infant that had fallen into pool permitted 
to have trial for emotional shock). 
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) does not expressly 
eliminate this claim. Appellant acknowledges the majority of the 
4
 The reference by SLCMH to the case of Connell v. Tooele 
City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977) is inopposite. In that case, the 
claims were for injuries arising out of false imprisonment by 
Tooele City. Obviously, the physical conduct giving rise to the 
complaint was committed by a governmental employee and the claim 
was not by a third party. 
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 T H E S U M M A R Y JUDGMENT DEIIES A REMEDY IN VIOLATION OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
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1198 (Colo. 1989); Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 
1988); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d at 1074 (Del. Supr. 1988). 
Likewise, the claim of SLCMH that the potential for liability 
would impose a "chilling affect upon the practice of mental health 
disciplines" is without support. The effect of this case will be 
to impose the standard of care upon mental health professionals 
that all medical professionals must meet. See Schuster v. 
Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Wis. 1988); Tarasoff v. Regents of 
the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); Mcintosh v. 
Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1979). 
Finally, the right sought to be protected is the right to 
recover for personal injuries that have tragically impacted a young 
girlfs life. It is a "substantial right, not only of monetary 
value but . . . fundamental to [Shaundra Higginsf] physical well 
being and ability to live a decent life." Condemarin v. University 
Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 360 (Utah 1989) (citing Hunter v. North 
Mason High School Dist., 539 P.2d 845, 848 (Wash. 1975). 
The Appellant does not challenge the summary judgment 
procedure as violating Article I, Section 11. It is the 
substantive effect of the summary judgment that arbitrarily 
deprives the Appellant of her constitutionally guaranteed remedy. 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). There 
is no legitimate objective in carving out psychotherapists from 
traditional negligence principles that impose upon medical 
professionals the duty to meet recognized standards of care. 
-24-
>-""-^~ '.iteu i 
const . . ..... i"a*-',4 ^ . itjn- apply Martinez v. 
California, 444 - ' •- and Dimas , ;-.;uni^  * 
n« uirts dismissed claims that conduct uf state 
correct inr^ i* . *eleasii is-Miii IS M m I L M I 
* 'under IOJ.<. I law" LhaL deprives "hie 
•I property Martinez 4* .r ; P-. • Dimas 730 F. Supp. ai nci, 
Appellanu and 
does ^o+" h*. * .!<-;• claims " ; •• ! i: enging 
* \ * arbitrary protect I .. . *
 Q class ui 
professi ona ] s \ ; 1 10 fa :i ] eel to exerci se :ii le care i n treating and 
evaluating a patient and fa i 1 € " \ < - ; ' the accepted standard oi 
care to protect the patient's v±c 
CONCLUSION 
For foregoing reasons, Appellant request Court 
reverse 
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